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At the beginning of the seventeenth century Sweden was fairly backward poor country in Europe’s 
northern periphery - a kingdom with a large territory stretching eastward in the European landmass 
but with few naval ambitions, especially in comparison with Sweden’s archenemy Denmark.(2) 
Sweden had an important navy, but an insignificant merchant marine. The kingdom’s foreign trade 
was limited, concentrated to the southern Baltic and carried by foreigners.(3) 
After two hundred years the situation was very different. Sweden stayed neutral during 
the first decade of the French Revolutionary Wars, as well as during other late eighteenth-
century conflicts, and it became an important neutral carrier in European and the world waters. 
According to French diplomatic reports in the mid-1780s the Swedish merchant marine was the 
fifth in Europe, only behind Britain, France, the Dutch Republic and Denmark-Norway, and 
in front of Spain, Two Sicilies and Portugal.(4) Moreover, the Swedish flag became the second 
most frequent in the Sound, only behind the British, and in front of the Dutch and the Danes. 
Undoubtedly, by 1800 Sweden was an important European carrier. 
From an inward-looking perspective, shipping sector became in the course of the time 
a important and dynamic part of Sweden’s economy. The freight incomes during the French 
Revolutionary Wars made a substantial share of the country’s foreign trade profit.(5) Another 
important change concerned the geographical scope of Swedish shipping operations. While the 
early seventeenth-century shipping was limited mainly to coastal shipping and traffic across the 
(1) This essay is revised paper that I presented in seminar kept in Kyoto Sangyo University on November 1, 2008.  I thank Prof. 
Toshiaki Tamaki for his kind invitation and the seminar participants for their comments. My special thanks go to Prof. 
George Bryan Souza for his extensive comments on my paper.
(2) On Sweden’s navy see Jan Glete, “Bridge and Bulwark. The Swedish Navy and the Baltic, 1500-1809” in Göran Rystad et 
al. In Quest of Trade and Security. The Baltic in Power Politics 1500-1990, vol. 1, Lund 1994; Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea 1500-50. 
Maritime conflicts and the transformation of Europe, London 2000. On Sweden’s merchant fleet see Eli F. Heckscher, Den 
svenska handelssjöfartens ekonomiska historia sedan Gustaf Vasa Sjöhistoriska samfundets skrifter, no 1, Uppsala 1940.
(3) For a general overview of Sweden’s economic development in the seventeenth century see Lars Magnusson, Sveriges ekonomiska 
historia, Stockholm 1996, pp. 107-108. More specifically for foreign trade see, Åke Sandström, Mellan Torneå och Amsterdam. 
En undersökning av Stockholms roll som förmedlare av varor i regional- och utrikeshandel, 1600–1650, Stockholm 1990.
(4) Ruggiero Romano, “Per una valutazione della flotta mercantile europea alla fine del secolo XVIII”, in: Studi in onore Amintore 
Fanfani, vol V, evi moderno e contemporaneo, Milano 1962, p. 578.
(5) Lennart Schön, En modern svensk ekonomisk historia, Stockholm 2000, p. 60.
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Baltic Sea, by 1800 the Swedish flag could be seen in Canton and Batavia, as well as in the West 
Indies and the USA.  Swedish shipping business became truly global activity.
The situation between 1600 and 1800 changed dramatically. This essay will describe this 
development and it will discuss some plausible explanations. Nevertheless, it must be stressed 
that much of research has to be done before we will properly understand this story; history of 
shipping is not well-researched area of Swedish history. Swedish shipping naturally must be put 
in the context of Sweden’s broader history, the short period of great power status, the fall during 
the Great Northern War (1700-21) and the outdrawn adjustment to political realities in the 
remaining part of the eighteenth century. 
In this essay I focus primarily on internal and external factors of the development. 
First, I will pay attention to Sweden’s mercantilist policy, especially its eighteenth-century 
Navigation Act (Produktionsplakatet). Secondly, I will analyze and evaluate the significance of 
the international situation – the external factor – and the role of Sweden’s neutrality in the late 
eighteenth century. These two factors must be related to Sweden’s “natural endowments”, cheap 
shipbuilding material and low labor costs, however, impact of these is much more difficult to 
evaluate.
Mercantilist Framework and the Anglo-Dutch Competition In The Seventeenth Century
Looking at the decades just after 1600, Sweden’s shipping was limited and it was concentrated to the 
nearby waters. In the Sound Toll Register Swedish shipping makes an insignificant share. The data 
for the first half of the seventeenth century are very scattered and unreliable. By 1613 and 1619 there 
were about 30 vessels from Stockholm active in the North Sea traffic, passing the Sound.(6) The 
data from the period 1646-56 show a rising number of Swedish-flagged vessels, between 100 and 
160 (westward and eastward-going). Then, the Swedes made about ten percent of vessels registered 
at the Sound. However, it is important to stress that a half of these ships originated in Swedish 
German ports: Stralsund, Wismar, and Stettin. The other half originated in Sweden-Finland, and 
only insignificant share originated in the Baltic provinces.(7) 
In the first half of the century the carrying business between the Baltic and North Seas was 
dominated by the Dutch. The Dutch shipping capacity was also very important for conduct 
of Swedish foreign trade, especially after 1620 when rising volumes of Swedish exports found 
their way to the Amsterdam staple market. Between 1627 and 1631 the Dutch controlled over 
two-thirds (65 per cent) of all carrying business from Swedish ports at the Sound and their share 
was the same by the mid-century.(8)   
The Dutch shipping to and from Sweden mirrored the fact that the Dutch credit, merchant 
(6) Heckscher, Den svenska handelssjöfartens ekonomiska historia, p. 11.
(7) Birger Fahlborg, “Ett blad ur den svenska handelsflottans historia 1660–1675”, in: Historisk tidskrift, 1923, pp.206, 213.
(8) P.W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt, Assen 1965, p. 267; 
Fahlborg, “Ett blad”, pp. 206-207.
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networks and commercial know-how ruled Sweden’s economy and foreign trade. This gave the 
Dutch economic power and influence in the same time when Sweden aspired for a position of 
European great power. Swedish leaders did not like this dependency, especially the Chancellor Axel 
Oxenstierna pointed out the kingdom’s disadvantageous situation and took steps to reduce it. 
This strive for a more independent Swedish position entailed a new conscious mercantilist 
policy, by 1650, aiming in diminishing Dutch economic influence. Regarding the shipping, the 
aims of the mercantilist policy were commercial and naval: first, support of Swedish shipping 
and shipbuilding in general, second, support of building of ships that could be included in the 
navy and used in wartime. Actually, this kind of measures was partly introduced already before 
the breakthrough of mercantilist policy in the 1650s. As early as on 31 July 1617 the Stockholm 
city privileges included important differentiation between three categories of merchant ships: 
monterade, omonterade, and foreign. The so-called monterade ships were heavy vessels, capable of 
carrying a number of guns. Such ships obtained reduced customs duties. Omonterade ships were 
not capable of carrying guns but they were Sweden-built; their duties were also reduced, but not 
as much as for the monterade ships. The third category included all other, non-Swedish vessels 
with no reduction of duties. The differentiation was shaped according to a Danish privilege and 
it shaped a basis for Sweden’s shipping policy for many years forward.
The important trade ordinance of 1645, regulating customs duties, was based on the same 
principal differentiation in three categories but it defined much more precisely the differences 
between them. It seems that an effect of the ordinance of 1645 was a growth of the merchant 
fleet. The wholly-free (helfria, monterade) ships, had to be built in oak and they had to carry at 
least 14 guns. Ships that paid a half of customs duties (halvfria, omonterade) were Swedish-built 
and Swedish-owned ships, all other ships paid full duties.  
The differences between the categories were slightly changed in 1661 and again in 1723, 
but the principle aim of building merchant ships for naval warfare was the same.(9) Ironically, 
the system of differentiation in three categories was out of date already in the 1650s. The 
development of naval warfare (especially the Anglo-Dutch Wars) enforced the maritime states 
to build bigger and bigger and more and more specialized naval ships – ships-of-the-line, which 
made merchant vessels in naval warfare obsolete.(10) In Sweden the last time merchant vessels 
actually were used in naval struggle was in 1645, in the war against Denmark. 
It is difficult to evaluate the significance of mercantilist policy in the rise of Sweden’s 
merchant fleet during this time. Apparently, the merchant fleet grew but this growth was not 
necessarily related to mercantilism. The growth, to a large extent, might be related to exploitation 
of Sweden’s neutrality during the three Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-74) and the Nine Years War 
(1689-98). The wars hindered naturally the Dutch from shipping in the Baltic Sea and the 
(9) Carl Danielsson, Protektionismens genombrott och tulltaxerevisionerna 1715 och 1718. Studier i merkantilistisk tullpolitik i Sverige, 
Stockholm 1930; Sven Gerentz, Kommerskollegium och näringslivet, Stockholm 1951, p. 91 ff.
(10) Jan Glete, “De statliga örlogsflottornas expansion. Kapprustningen till sjöss i Väst och Nordeuropa 1650-80”, Studier i äldre 
historia tillägnade Herman Schück, Stockholm 1985.  
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Swedes replaced them. 
It is apparent that already during the First Anglo-Dutch War the Swedes successfully 
exploited their neutrality. For example, in the wartime year 1652 there were 175 Swedish-
registered vessels in the Sound, by comparison a very large number. Nevertheless, the expanding 
Swedish activity in shipping also entailed conflicts with the English, who between 1652 and 1654 
captured a number of Swedish-flagged ships.(11)
The decades between 1660 and 1700 also testify about large fluctuations in shipping during 
wartime. First, in 1665-67 and 1672-74, the number of Swedish ships expanded largely. Previously 
we have looked at the figure for Sound traffic. Figures for ship passports (fribrev) issued by the 
Swedish Board of Trade are another indicator of the development of shipping. In 1665, at the 
beginning of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, the Board issued only eight passports. In 1666 the 
number rose to 114!(12) Such expansion, naturally, could not be supplied by Swedish shipyards, 
and much of this “new” tonnage was of Dutch origin. Dutch ship-owners simply changed flag. 
A good example of such abuse of the flag was the rise of the small port of Stade in the Bishopric 
of Bremen, then a part of the Swedish kingdom and near to the Dutch border. In 1666 and 
1667, Stade’s fleet expanded to 4,500 heavy lasts and the town became second ship-owning 
port in Sweden, just behind Stockholm’s fleet of 11,291 heavy lasts.(13) No doubt, the majority 
of Stade’s ships were Dutch.(14) Riga in eastern coast of the Baltic Sea went through similar 
development. Riga was the largest city in Swedish Baltic Provinces (present Estonia and Latvia) 
and a very important export port. Riga’s fleet also expanded during the Anglo-Dutch War. The 
years 1665-67 showed the profitability of neutral carrying business between belligerents.(15) But 
the exploitation of neutrality also caused problems with the English authorities.(16)
The decade 1670-80 is perhaps the best example of the violent shifts in shipping volumes 
related to the wartime. During the Third Anglo-Dutch War the Swedish shipping thrived taking 
a significant share of the Dutch and English carrying from Sweden. Between 1672 and 1674 the 
English flag disappeared from the Swedish ports and that of the Dutch was significantly reduced. 
Looking at the Sound Toll data there were about 150-170 Swedish westbound ships in Sound 
in the same years. Nevertheless, the English were well aware of the fact that a large share of the 
Swedish-flagged shipping actually was of Dutch tonnage and, in similarity with previous wartime 
years, they continued to harass Swedish-flagged ships.(17) Harassment entailed complains from 
(11) Werner Pursche, “Stockholms handelssjöfart och de engelska kaperierna 1652–1654”, in: Studier och handlingar rörande 
Stockholms historia, vol. 3, Stockholm 1966, pp. 112-180.
(12) Fahlborg, “Ett blad”, p. 219.
(13) 1 heavy last=2.448 metric ton. Heavy last was typical Swedish measurement unit. Leos Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce. 
The Swedish Consular Service and Long-Distance Shipping, 1720-1815, Uppsala 2004, p. 242. 
(14) Fahlborg, “Ett blad”, p. 232, for Stockholm see p. 240.
(15) Fahlborg, “Ett blad”, p. 221.
(16) For details see Fahlborg, “Ett blad”, p. 226; Pursche, “Stockholms handelssjöfart”. 
(17) Steve Murdoch & Andrew Little & A.D.M. Forte, “Scottish Privateering, Swedish Neutrality and Prize Law in the Third 
Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674”, Forum navale 59, 2003, pp. 37-65; A.D.M. Forte & Edward Furgol & Steve Murdoch, “The 
Burgh of Stade and the Maryland ‘Court of Admiralty’ of 1672”, Forum navale 60, 2004, pp. 94-113.
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Swedish merchants and ship-owners, and diplomatic exchanges on highest level. 
The situation reversed completely during the Swedish-Danish War 1675-79. In June 1676, 
the Danish-Dutch joint force defeated the Swedish navy at the battle of Öland. An outcome of 
the battle was more or less complete Danish-Dutch control of the Baltic and North Seas and 
an elimination of Swedish shipping trade. Until the peace of 1679 there were no Swedish vessels 
at the Sound and Swedish shipping was reduced to coastal shipping to Finland and Baltic 
Provinces. Because the Dutch were engaged in the war on the Danish side, the English carriers 
were able to replace the Dutch shipping capacity in Sweden and, consequently, to increase their 
share in Sweden’s foreign trade. The wartime period of 1675-79, finally, connected Sweden with 
the expanding British market and for more than a hundred years Britain became major market 
for Swedish staple products.(18) Regarding the direction of Sweden’s foreign trade, thus, the 
changes of the 1670s had lasting consequences.
A paradoxical outcome of the Swedish-Danish War 1675-79 was a closer cooperation between 
Sweden and Denmark as neutral carriers—in spite of the fact that the two states continued 
to be each other’s archenemy. The Swedish-Danish alliance treaty of 1679 included a part on 
neutral shipping and this cooperation was strengthened after the outbreak of the Nine Years 
War. In 1691, Denmark and Sweden signed a treaty “Union des Neutres pour la Sécurité de la 
Navigation et du Commerce” aiming at joined convoying and defence of Scandinavian flags.(19) 
In the eighteenth century that kind of cooperation continued and reached an international 
acknowledgment in the Leagues of Armed Neutrality 1780-83 and 1800. 
The early 1690s were the best years of Swedish shipping in the seventeenth century. The 
number of Swedish-registered vessels in foreign trade increased to 750.(20) It took 80 years, until 
the boom of the American War of Independence in the 1770s, before Sweden registered the 
same numbers of vessels at the Sound.(21) 
The development of Swedish shipping between 1650 and 1700 was also characterized by 
large fluctuations between different carriers during wartime. Primarily, this must be ascribed to 
naval warfare in the period: the Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-French wars, as well as the Swedish-
Danish conflicts. To a large extent the fluctuations should be related to changes of flag, not to 
the rise in shipbuilding capacity in Sweden. The Dutch origin of the Swedish-flagged tonnage 
in the 1690s is obvious even when we look at the migration of Dutch shipmasters to Swedish 
ports. The Dutch historian Tonko Ufkes analyzed the migration of Dutch skippers to Stockholm 
between 1685 and 1699, and he unveiled a clear relationship between the inflow of the Dutch 
skippers and the Nine Years’ War.(22)
(18) Leos Müller, “Britain and Sweden: the changing pattern of commodity exchange, 1650–1680”, Patrick Salmon and Tony 
Barrow (eds.), Britain and the Baltic: Studies in Commercial, Political and Cultural Relations 1500-2000, Sunderland 2003.
(19) Mikael af Malmborg, Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden, Chippenham 2001, p. 31.
(20) Heckscher, Den svenska handelssjöfartens ekonomiska historia, p. 17. 
(21) See Nina Ellinger Bang- Knud Korst, Tabeller over skibsfart och varetransport gennem Øresund 1661-1783, Copenhagen 1930.
(22) Tonko Ufkes, “Nederländska skeppare på stockholmska handelsskepp, 1685-00”, Forum navale 56, 2001, pp. 35-59. 
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Another noteworthy feature of the Swedish shipping between 1660 and 1700 was an 
extension of the geographical scope of shipping activities. While early decades of the seventeenth 
century were characterized by shipping within the Baltic Sea, by the late decades of the century 
Swedish ships were going beyond the Sound. Also the shipping to southern Europe, to the 
Mediterranean even the Canary Islands became more and more usual. Swedes carried salt 
cargoes from Setubal and the Mediterranean. The extended scope of shipping activities also 
meant new problems. In similarity with other Christian ships even Swedes were hassled by 
Barbary corsairs and many Swedish sailors got into  North African slavery.(23) In 1691, there were 
at least a hundred Swedish slaves only in Alger and Tunis. The connection with southern Europe 
that became so important for the Swedish shipping in the eighteenth century was established 
already in these decades. 
Swedish Shipping during the Eighteenth Century
In the years 1700-21 Sweden lost its Baltic Empire to Russia, it lost its great power status and, 
moreover, it went through a constitutional revolution that significantly reduced the king’s power. All 
the changes had major impact on Sweden’s mercantilist policy that had to adjust to the situation—the 
situation of a small state. In comparison with seventeenth-century ambitions the mercantilist policy 
adopted after 1721, thus, was much more realistic, with focus on the areas in which the country had 
comparative advantages. Sweden had a number of advantages; it had abundant and relatively cheap 
natural resources: iron and copper ores, woods, water power. In spite of the northern location and 
great distance from main European markets Sweden was in a relatively good transport situation. It 
had long coast and good sea connections with Western Europe. Also the fact that Sweden avoided 
direct engagement in the Anglo-French wars gave its trade an important competitive edge. 
These comparative advantages were accompanied by an institutional package that 
facilitated Sweden’s economic development in the course of the eighteenth-century.(24) The 
most important institutional measure, relating to the shipping sector, was Navigation Act 
(Produktplakatet) enacted in 1724 and shaped according to the English Navigation Acts. There 
are two important differences between Produktplakatet and the seventeenth-century ship 
differentiation. Produktplakatet forbade all carrying to and from Sweden that was not on the 
Swedish bottoms or bottoms of cargo producer’s countries. This measure was directed against 
the Dutch, and it, indeed, eliminated Dutch shipping to and from Sweden. For example, before 
1724 salt cargoes coming from Portugal or the Mediterranean were predominantly carried on 
Dutch bottoms. According to Produktplakatet, after 1724, this shipping could only be carried 
(23) Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, pp. 56-60. 
(24) For a contemporary comparison of advantages and disadvantages of Sweden’s shipping with other countries, see Johan 
Westerman, Om Sveriges Fördelar och Svårigheter i Sjöfarten, i jämförelse emot andra Riken,  Kongl. Vetenskaps Academiens 
handlingar för år 1768 vol xxix, Stockholm 1768.(Transcription on line: http://www.bruzelius.info/nautica/Maritime_History/
SE/Westerman(1768).html, 26 November 2008) 
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by Swedish or southern-European ships. And because there was no southern-Europeans  in the 
Baltic Sea, effectively, salt trade became Swedish monopoly. 
Shipping of salt was extremely demanding as regards tonnage, It was barely profitable, 
because salt prices were low, but in Sweden, with long winters and dependent on salt-conserved 
food, salt was strategic commodity.(25) Yet, the large in-going capacity (with cargoes of salt) 
made it difficult to fill the out-going shipping capacity with suitable and profitable goods. Even 
Sweden’s main export cargoes were voluminous but relatively cheap: iron, tar and pitch, sawn 
timber. The combination of voluminous and low-priced but strategically important exports 
and imports made the shipping sector hardly profitable. According to a contemporary Swedish 
treatise (1768), an export cargo on a Swedish vessel with Mediterranean destination was about 
ten to fifty times less valuable than a comparable cargo on a Dutch or English vessel.(26) Yet, salt 
imports were of such strategic importance that the state kept the Produktplakatet in work during 
the whole eighteenth century. Obviously, it was difficult to make such a business competitive 
and the Swedish ship-owner had to find other ways to make money in shipping. An important 
way – even if it is difficult to evaluate exactly – was tramp shipping in southern Europe. We 
will return to it later on. 
A second difference, in comparison between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
mercantilist policies, was the role of naval interest. The seventeenth-century policy was intended 
to build a merchant fleet that could be used in wartime. But in 1724 the naval warfare was a 
business of specialized ships-of-the-line and there was no need for merchant vessels in naval 
warfare – of course, with exception of transports. Produktplakatet did not concern different 
categories of ships. Yet, it should be noted that the differentiation of vessels into three categories 
survived until the 1782 regulation of customs duties.(27)  This does not mean that Produktplakatet 
had never been understood in a naval context. A large merchant fleet made a pool of experienced 
seamen and officers who could be recruited for the navy in the situation of need. In similarity 
with the English, also the Swedish merchant fleet served as a nursery of seamen. This aspect of 
the Swedish shipping policy has not been much stressed by historians, perhaps because of the 
limited use of the Swedish navy in the eighteenth century. But it was definitely considered when 
the debate about Produktplakatet was going on in 1723. It is important to mention that exactly 
this military aspect convinced Adam Smith to appreciate the English Navigation Acts, in spite 
of the fact that they were product of the hated mercantilist policy.(28)
The discussions about the protection of Swedish shipping in the years 1721-23 were related 
to a typical mercantilist debate on the country’s balance of trade. According to the calculations 
(25) On Sweden’s mercantilist policy concerning salt, see Stefan Carlén, Staten som marknadens salt. En studie i institutionsbildning, 
kollektivt handlande och tidig välfärdspolitik på en strategisk varumarknad i övergången mellan merkantilism  och liberalism 1720–
1862, Stockholm 1997, and Stefan Carlén,  “An institutional analysis of the Swedish salt market, 1720-1862”, in: Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, vol. 42, 1994/1.
(26) Westerman, Om Sveriges Fördelar. 
(27) Heckscher, Den svenska handelssjöfartens ekonomiska historia, p. 27. 
(28) Heckscher, Den svenska handelssjöfartens ekonomiska historia, p. 26. 
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of the Board of Trade, Sweden had a large deficit of the balance of trade and freights paid to 
the Dutch and British ship-owners made an important part of it.(29) In reality, Produktplakatet 
did not affect British shipping. Britain’s trade with Sweden was based on exports of Swedish 
products: bar iron, tar, pitch, sawn goods, and so it could be and was carried on British bottoms. 
The Dutch were engaged in imports – mainly of salt as mentioned, and Produktplakatet 
excluded them from this business. The direct imports from the Dutch Republic were limited. 
The impact of Produktplakatet on the Dutch shipping is apparent in the Sound Toll data. In 
1725 and 1726 the number of Dutch ships passing the Sound from Sweden collapsed to six and 
three respectively.(30)
Produktplakatet was not accepted unanimously in Sweden. Small town merchants, especially, 
were afraid of shortage of shipping capacity and the lack of resources needed for shipbuilding 
and shipping business. Thus, the critic of Produktplakatet became a part of Sweden’s eighteenth-
century political debate. Anders Chydenius, priest and political thinker of Finnish origin was 
the most renowned opponent. During the insurgent years of the riksdag 1765-66, Chydeinus 
published the work entitled Källan til Rikets Wan-Magt (The Source of the Country’s Misery). 
According to him, Produktplakatet was this source of the country’s misery. Chydenius’s major 
critical argument was that the Act made Swedish goods more expensive because the Swedish 
shipping was inefficient and uncompetitive.(31) 
The Act became the central institution of the mercantilist policy on Swedish shipping. Yet, 
it was joined by a number of other institutions. A new Convoy Office (Konvojkommissariatet) 
was created at Gothenburg, with the aim not only of convoying Swedish vessels during wartime 
but also organizing the Swedish consular service in North Africa.(32) The building up of the 
consular network in southern Europe was a necessary institutional precondition of Swedish 
shipping in the region. 
This mercantilist policy shaped an institutional package, a framework within which shipping 
activities developed but, as we could see in the seventeenth century, the policy itself could not 
guarantee any long-term expansion. The sixty years between 1721, the end of Great Northern 
War, and 1780, the beginning of Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, were characterized by relatively slow 
increase in shipping. The number of Swedish vessels in the Sound increased from about 400 in 
1720s to about 800 in the 1770s.(33) The pattern of shipping after 1721 followed well the practice 
established after 1650 and, in similarity with the seventeenth century, the international situation 
did play much more important role for the overall development and alterations in shipping 
activities than mercantilist policy. 
However, the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84) caused a dramatic change. The war 
(29) Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, p. 61. 
(30) Bang-Korst, Tabeller over skibsfart. 
(31)  Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, p. 63.
(32) Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, p. 65. 
(33) Bang-Korst, Tabeller over skibsfart.
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reduced the Dutch shipping, both in short and long-term, and the Swedes and Danes took over 
the Dutch shares. This was a qualitative shift, in particular, in the Swedish figures. The numbers 
of Swedish-flagged ships in the Sound jumped from about 800 vessels in the mid-1770s to 
over 2,000 in 1785. During the 1780s Sweden became the second largest shipping nation in 
the Baltic Sea, after Britain and in front of the Dutch Republic and Denmark. Another way to 
confirm the qualitative change of the situation of Swedish shipping in the 1780s is the above-
quoted French figures on European merchant fleets. The French report estimated the Swedish 
merchant fleet at about 1,200 vessels (170,000 tons), making it the fifth largest in Europe.(34)
It is not known to what extent this expansion was a result of purchases of foreign (Dutch) 
tonnage, as it was usual in the seventeenth century, and to what extent the expansion in the 
1770s and 1780s was based on domestic shipbuilding. Yet, definitively, the situation in the 
1780s was different in comparison with the boom of the 1680s and 1690s. The post-1780 
expansion was preceded by a freeing of shipping from northern Sweden, endorsed at the 
riksdag 1765-66. Until this riksdag all foreign trade from the Gulf of Bothnia was channeled 
through Stockholm that kept monopoly foreign trade rights for northern Sweden (the so-called 
bottniska handelstvånget). The coastal areas around the Gulf of Bothnia, especially on the eastern 
Finnish side (Österbotten), were important producers of tar, pitch and sawn timber, and with 
expanding ship-building activities. The rising numbers of vessels from Finland and northern 
Sweden show that the policy was successful.(35) 
However, it is also important to note that between 20 and 25 per cent of Swedish-flagged 
tonnage actually originated in Swedish Pomerania. The numbers of Pomerania-registered ships 
were, actually, far larger than the numbers of Finland-registered ships. Also when we look at 
shipping patterns there were important differences. Pomeranian ships were often smaller and 
seemingly more flexible. The first destination, mentioned in the Algerian passport registers, 
indicates that Pomeranian ships often first sailed to the eastern Baltic, to take south-bound 
cargo such as grain, timber. Then, they continued to southern Europe.(36) The practice of 
tramp shipping meant that ships were contracted for freights between Mediterranean ports, 
for example between Marseilles and Livorno. This was typical pattern for Swedish shipping 
business in southern Europe. Moreover, the Pomeranian vessels, due their proximity to Prussian 
ports, could and frequently did shift the flag. During the Russo-Swedish War (1788-90) many 
Swedish ships moved under the Prussian flag.(37)
(34) Romano, “Per una valutazione della flotta mercantile”. Naturally, the French estimates may be criticized but there are no 
better data for European merchant fleets, see also Richard W. Unger, “The Tonnage of Europe’s Merchant Fleets, 1300-1800”, 
in: American Neptune, 1992/4, pp. 247-261; Angus Maddison, The World Economy. A Millenial Perspective, OECD 2001, p. 77, 
Table 2-15. 
(35) Yrjö Kaukiainen, History of Finnish Shipping, London and New York 1993, p. 38-49; Staffan Högberg, Utrikeshandel och sjöfart 
på 1700-talet. Stapelvaror i svensk export och import 1738–1808, Stockholm 1969, pp. 143-164.
(36) Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, p. 151; Jan Kilborn, “Den svenska utrikeshandelsflottan åren 1795-1820. En 
pilotstudie i Kommerskollegiums fribrevsdiarier”, in: Forum navale 63, 2007, pp. 38-69. 
(37) For example, Hans Chr. Johansen, “Østersjøhandelen og den svensk-russiske krig 1788-90”, Erhvervshistorisk årbog Meddelelser 
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Even if the pattern of volatility related to fluctuations between peacetime and wartime 
continued there were some important differences between the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. For eighteenth-century shipping southern Europe played much more important 
role. The policy of shipping after 1724 was shaped to secure sufficient supplies of Portuguese 
and Mediterranean salt to keep salt prices low, and to avoid the Dutch carrying trade. Southern 
Europe was seen as an important potential market for Swedish iron and naval stores. Moreover, 
it is clear that in the course of the century tramp shipping had become as well a crucial activity 
for Swedish merchants and ship-owners. 
A fruitful way to study the changed patterns of Swedish shipping in this period is analysing 
Algerian passport registers. The passport system was an outcome of the peace and trade treaties 
with the Barbary States and it provided Swedish ship-owners, captains and their crews with 
safety from corsair attacks.(38) The registers include all Swedish ships sailing to the Iberian 
Peninsula, Mediterranean and other parts of the world (the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, China) 
south of Cape Finisterre, a cape in northern Spain, thus the registers provide detailed evidence 
of overall Sweden’s long-distance shipping. Unfortunately destinations recorded are only 
indicatives of the first destination. As noted before, when the ship took a cargo in eastern Baltic, 
this first destination was mentioned in the passports. But passport registers provide information 
about the length of voyages, and this indicates primarily if the purpose of the voyage was tramp 
shipping or just export-import business. But they did not say specifically anything about the 
scope of the tramp shipping, the ports visited, cargoes loaded, et cetera.
There was a steady but not very rapid increase in the number of passports (voyages beyond 
Cape Finisterre), from about 130 by 1740 to about 200 by 1770. In similarity with the Sound Toll 
data evidence, the period 1770-83 was characterized by a rapid increase. In 1782, the best year of the 
boom of American War of Independence, there were 441 passports issued. Similar rapid increase is 
then visible during the French Revolutionary Wars 1793-1815.(39) Thus, the evidence from Algerian 
passports confirms, too, the logic of wartime booms for neutral Swedish flag.
The pattern of voyages can be analyzed in the total number of days the vessel was away. Table 
1, based on the Algerian passport registers data from 1777-85, indicates, a very large variation 
between vessels. Nevertheless, only about ten per cent of ships returned home during the same 
sailing season. About 90 per cent of ships stayed abroad for the next season or longer. There are 
about 20 per cent of ships going in tramp shipping for three and even more years. No doubt, 
the table indicates that a large share of Swedish vessels was going in tramp shipping. 
The tramp shipping in southern Europe was also a consequence of the seasonal character 
of Swedish shipping. Ships from west coast (Gothenburg) or Swedish Pomerania usually left 
northern waters at the beginning of the year and were able to return back the same sailing 
fra Ehrvervsarkivet XXVII 1976-77, pp. 35-54. 
(38) Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, pp. 144-147.
(39)Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce, p. 236, Appendix D. 
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season. However, ships from the Baltic Sweden and Finland usually left homeport fairly late 
(June-August) and had to stay abroad to the next year’s sailing season, consequently they 
continued to sail for freight during winter. In the course of time this pattern became more and 
more usual and Swedish ships stayed abroad for longer and longer periods. 
Data on arrivals at Mediterranean ports indicate that a large number of Swedish ships 
was going between Mediterranean ports. In Genoa, Barcelona, Livorno, Marseilles Swedes 
belonged among the major shipping nations.(40) The Danish and Swedish shipping appeared, 
in the long term, replacing the French, the Dutch and English capacity. Partly, this obviously 
was a consequence of Scandinavian neutrality and peace treaties with the Barbary states; but 
probably this also reflected the fact that the French and English ship-owners preferred business 
in the protected and plausibly more profitable colonial trades, in the West Indies and in the 
Indian Ocean. 
Moreover, the Algerian passport registers provide also a good ground for analysis of 
composition of Swedish shipping. Of course, the registers include only a part of all Swedish 
ships, but a fairly representative part.  Table 2 categorizes the ships according to registered 
tonnage. First we have to note that there is huge discrepancy between smallest and largest ships. 
In 1780 the smallest ships registered had a tonnage between 20 and 30 lasts (49-74 metric tons). 
On the other side of the set we will find Swedish East Indiamen, Sophia Magdalena and Gustav 
den tredje, with tonnages 500 and 514 heavy lasts (c. 1,200 metric tons). Table 2 shows that these 
were extremes. Vessels with tonnages above 150 heavy lasts were very unusual, representing 10-
(40) Hans Chr. Johansen, “Scandinavian shipping in the late eighteenth century in a European perspective”, in: Economic History 
Review, 1992/3, p. 483; Dan H. Andersen and Hans-Joachim Voth, “The Grapes of War: Neutrality and Mediterranean 
Shipping under Danish Flag, 1747-1807”, in: Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol. 48, 1, 2000, p. 9; Charles Carrière, 
Négociants marseillais au XVIIIe siècle, Marseilles 1973, p. 1061. 
Table 1: Swedish Algerian passports returned, according to the date of return, 1777-85
Source: Algerian passport registers, KK Huvudarkivet, Sjöpassdiarier, 1769-78, CIIb, (Swedish National 
Archives, Stockholm) 1777-85. 
Year Totally issued Second year Third year Fourth year Fifth year Sixth year
1777 253 29 162 44 8 3 1
1778 287 41 128 45 22 3 1
1779 282 40 122 67 20 6 5
1780 320 40 172 68 21 3 1
1781 373 49 190 85 22 4 3
1782 441 25 267 74 20 11 2
1783 339 35 208 50 23 4 2
1784 370 44 225 48 17 7 2
1785 389 49 192 96 10 3 4
Total 3054 352 1666 577 163 44 21




15 per cent of the samples. About a half of all vessels had tonnages between 50 and 100 lasts (c. 
125-250 metric tons), and about a one quarter between 100 and 150 lasts (c. 250-375 metric tons). 
This explains why an average tonnage per ship was so low in comparison with the largest ships, 
below 100 lasts. The averages of the representative years 1770, 1780 and 1800 with large numbers 
of passports issued, had average shipping tonnage between 85 and 95 lasts. The average for 1790 
is not fully representative because this was the year of shipping just recovering after the Russo-
Swedish War 1788-90. Most probably the largest ships went first abroad. But, decline in average 
tonnage in combination with rapidly expanding number of vessels going abroad might be 
explained by the fact that during wartime booms, such as the French Revolutionary Wars, even 
small coastal vessels went out in profitable tramp shipping. Nevertheless, more research has to 
be done to understand the strategies of Swedish ship-owners during the volatile conditions of 
late eighteenth-century shipping trade. 
Also after 1780 an overwhelming share of Swedish ships continued to sail in European 
waters. But there is plenty of qualitative evidence of Swedish presence in more distanced 
waters. For example, only between 1781 and 1783 in Bordeaux, there were six Swedish vessels 
registered for destinations in the French Antilles.(41) In 1784-85 the Swedish ship Concordia 
sailed from Lorient in France to Isle of France (Mauritius) and continued to Batavia and back 
to Amsterdam. The ship was hired by the French, for the route Lorient-Mauritius, and by 
the Dutch, for the route Batavia-Amsterdam.(42) Data of arrivals from Mauritius and Reunion 
indicate fairly active Swedish shipping during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, in spite of the fact 
that the Swedes lacked colony in the Indian Ocean.(43) This shipping in the Indian Ocean, as 
(41) Private information, Jean-Claude Bats. 12 August 2008.
(42) C. F. Hornstedt, Brev från Batavia. En resa till Ostindien 1782-86, (ed. Christina Granroth), Stockholm 2008, p. 251.
(43) Auguste Toussaint, La Route des Îles. Contribution à l’histoire maritime des Mascareignes, Paris 1967, pp. 168, 170, 172, 174.
Table 2: Composition of Swedish tonnage in long-distance shipping, 
1770, 1780, 1790 and 1800 (based on Algerian passport registers)
Tonnage in heavy lasts 1770 1780 1790 1800
1-50 25 46 11 121
51-100 115 169 54 343
101-150 33 67 33 124
151-200 10 16 7 14
Above 200 15 22 10 22
Sum of ships 198 320 115 624
Sum tonnage 18748 29845 12534 53127
94.7 93.3 109 85.6
Source: Algerian passport registers, KK Huvudarkivet, Sjöpassdiarier, CIIb, 
(Swedish National Archives, Stockholm) 1770-1800. 
Average tonnage (heavy lasts)
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well as the activities in the Atlantic, were related to the Dutch difficulties during the Fourth 
Anglo-Dutch War. Sweden together with Denmark and some other neutral carriers simply 
exploited profitable business opportunity. In principle, this was a short-term advantage that 
disappeared as soon as the war was over; and apparently in the shipping data from the Indian 
Ocean the Swedish flag disappeared after 1784.(44) 
This shipping was basically shipping for freight and it had nothing in common with the 
Swedish East India Company that kept monopoly rights for Swedish traffic beyond the Cape 
of Good Hope. Swedish East India Company ships were going mainly between Gothenburg 
and Canton in China, and they deliberately avoided Asian colonies of other European powers. 
The company sent out only two ships annually, in average, but the ships were very large, as 
we could notice above, and the values of return cargoes were considerable. In difference to the 
wartime booms the Company carried on its business continuously, even if it has to be pointed 
out that the most profitable period in the Company’s history also was the years of American 
War of Independence.(45)
The shipping business in the West Indies became much more active after the acquisition 
of the island of St Barthélemy in 1784. King Gustav III received this tiny island from France 
in exchange for staple rights in Gothenburg. The colony was small and it had no notable 
population or sugar production, however, it had a good harbor and in wartime it quickly could 
be converted into a center of neutral trade – a Swedish St Eustatius. This occurred during 
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars when the Swedish harbor of Gustavia on St 
Barthélemy became a free haven of traffic between the United States and the West Indies. 
St Barthélemy drew on the decline of Dutch West Indies. Nevertheless, strictly speaking the 
Swedish-flagged shipping at Gustavia had nothing to do with Sweden. The ships brought only 
Swedish flag, they were built, owned and run by foreigners with almost no connection with 
Sweden. They did not go to Sweden. 
Concluding Remarks
The evaluation of the overall economic significance of Swedish long-distance shipping is no easy 
task. Nevertheless, the combination of data from Algerian passport registers, the Sound Toll Register 
and scattered evidence from shipping lists, lists of arrivals, letters, consular reports and other sources 
indicate that the scope of Swedish shipping activities was much larger than previously believed, and 
a very large share of the Swedish tonnage was employed in tramp shipping business. The major 
area of Swedish tramp shipping was the Mediterranean, however there were also a rising number 
of Swedish ships active in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean – in spite of the fact that country lacked 
(44) Toussaint, La Route des Îles. 
(45) Christian Koninckx, The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731–1766), Kortrijk 1980; Leos Müller, 
“The Swedish East India Trade and International Markets: Re-exports of teas, 1731-1813”, in: Scandinavian Economic History 
Review, vol. 51, 2003/3, pp. 28-44. 
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a colonial empire. 
The crucial moment of the eighteenth-century development of the long-distance shipping 
was not the Swedish Navigation Act, as has been believed for many years, but the American 
War of Independence, and especially the later period 1780-84. There were two important factors 
of the expansion in 1780-84: the League of Armed Neutrality and the withdrawal of the Dutch 
shipping capacity, a consequence of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. 
It is clear that the development of Swedish shipping between 1650 and 1800 was directly 
related to the international situation – to the Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-French wars, and 
Sweden’s neutrality. This relationship suggests that the outdrawn warfare (the Second Hundred 
Years War) shaped a trading system that to a large extent depended on non-belligerents’ carrying 
capacity. Undoubtedly, the British and French merchant marines were largest and by far most 
important European carriers, but the neutral Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Hanseatic, Portuguese, 
Two Sicilies, and after 1783 American fleets mattered too. Eighteenth-century global trade 
should not work as efficiently as it, indeed, did without this non-belligerent carrying capacity. 
Warfare was almost constantly present in the world, but in spite of the warfare the trade grew, 
both in the North Sea, Baltic and the Atlantic. Warfare had also less negative impact on the 
functioning of the eighteenth-century trading system than some historians believe. Only during 
the Napoleonic Wars the fighting entailed a dramatic decline in international trade.(46)
Yet the dependency on wartime bust and boom changes also made the shipping sector 
extremely volatile. This is clearly visible in the correlation between volatile international freight 
rates and Swedish shipping activities (figure 1). It is difficult to separate different factors of 
the story of Swedish shipping: the mercantilist policy, the costs of shipbuilding, labor crew, 
profitability of the business. At the moment there is no analysis of Swedish shipping on 
this level. Nevertheless, the overall picture shows that Swedish shipping by 1800 became an 
important sector of Swedish economy and this sector did play a crucial role in nineteenth-
century industrialization which in Sweden was closely related to export trade.
(46) Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History. The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic 
Economy, Cambridge (Mass.) 1999; Kevin H. O’Rourke, “The worldwide economic impact of the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars, 1793-1815”, in: Journal of Global History, 2006/1, pp. 123-149; Francois Crouzet, “Wars, Blockade, and 
Economic Change in Europe, 1792-1815,” in: The Journal of Economic History, vol. 24, 1964/4, pp. 567-588. 
44 パブリック・ヒストリー



































































Source: Leos Müller, Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce. The Swedish Consular Service and Long-Distance Shipping, 
1720-1815, Uppsala 2004, p. 236; C. Knick Harley, “Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity 1740-1913: The primacy of 
Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed”, in: The Journal of Economic History, vol. XLVIII, No 4  (Dec 1988) p. 851-876. 
The freight rate series in Harley’s article covers only freight rates for grain. The series works only as a proxy of the 
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Figure 2 : Swedish ships registered in the Sound, 1661-1783











Table 3: Sweden-registered ships 1693-99
























1 Swedish heavy last=2.448 metric ton
1651-72: Birger Fahlborg, “Ett blad ur den svenska handelsflottans historia (1660–1675)”, in: Historisk tidskrift, 1923.
1693, 1723-26, 1774: Eli F. Heckscher, Den svenska handelssjöfartens ekonomiska historia sedan Gustaf Vasa Sjöhistoriska 
samfundets skrifter, no 1, Uppsala 1940, p. 22. 
1723-60, 1785, 1790, 1795, 1799: D.Hj.T. Börjeson, Stockholms segelsjöfart. Anteckningar om huvudstadens kofferdiflotta 
och dess män  med en översikt av stadens och rikets sjöfartsförhållanden från äldsta tid intill våra dagar, Stockholm 1932. 
1760, 1800: Bengt Carlson, ”Sverige handel och sjöfart på Medelhavet 1797-1803”, in: Åke Holmberg (ed.), Handel 
och sjöfart under gustaviansk tid, Meddelanden från historiska institutionen i Göteborg, nr 4. Göteborg 1971, p. 18.
1795, 1800-1806: Seved Johnson, Sverige och stormakterna 1800-1804. Studier i svensk handels- och utrikespolitik, Lund 
1957, p. 247.
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Table 4: Major European merchant marines 1786-87
Country Number of vessels Tonnage (tons)
Britain - 881963
France 5268 729340




The Two Sicilies 1047 132220 
Hanseatic towns 467 101347
Portugal 300 84843
Other merchant marines 339848
Total 3372029
Source: Ruggiero Romano, “Per una valutazione della flotta mercantile europea alla fine del secolo XVIII”, in: Studi 
in onore Amintore Fanfani, vol V, evi moderno e contemporaneo, Milano 1962, p. 578. The data based on information 
collected by French consuls in European countries. 
Table 5: Sweden-registered ships according to the origin, 1795-1809
Year Sweden proper Finland Sw Pomerania Total
1795 883 83 269 1235
1796 869 113 289 1271
1797 922 124 316 1362
1798 920 118 315 1353
1799 852 126 324 1302
1800 971 161 368 1500
1801 956 167 364 1487
1802 988 180 371 1539
1803 1012 166 374 1552
1804 994 177 363 1534
1805 985 159 332 1476
1806 928 142 283 1353
1807 853 109 246 1208
1808 797 31 216 1044
1809 831 2 218 1051
Source: Jan Kilbohrn, “Den svenska utrikes handelsflottan åren 1795-1820
En pilotstudie i Kommerskollegiums fribrevsdiarier” (available on: http://www.hgu.gu.se/files/ekonomisk_historia/
högreseminariet/pilotstudie-jk-95-1820.pdf, 2008-10-15). Note in the Swedish-Russian War 1808-1809 Sweden lost 
Finland.
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【解説】　
　1990年代になって、スウェーデンの歴史家のあいだで、近世スウェーデン商業の重要性を国際的に認識させ
ようという動きが活発になって来た。ここに掲載されているレオス・ミュラーの論文は、そのような研究動向
を顕著に示す。
　スウェーデンは、イギリスやフランス、さらにはスペイン、ポルトガル、オランダと同様、近世において貿
易量を大きく増やした。そのスウェーデンは、海運業を発達させるために、2つの重要な政策を採用した。そ
れは、1724年の航海法（Produktplakatet）を発布し、自国船による貿易を増加させたことと、中立政策をとっ
たことである。
　航海法は、イギリスの貿易政策と似通っており、オランダ船の排除を意図していた。さらに中立政策は、交
戦国によるスウェーデン船の利用を促進した。18世紀のヨーロッパは戦争の時代であり、中立国スウェーデン
を利用することで、ヨーロッパ全体の貿易量はあまり低下せずに済み、さらにスウェーデンの海運業が大きく
発展したのである。
　スウェーデンは17世紀前半にはオランダの貿易圏に組み込まれていたが、1670年代からイギリスへの鉄輸出
をメインとする貿易システムに転換する。それはまた、イギリスの大西洋経済形成に寄与したことと考えられ
る。
　さらにスウェーデンは領事制度を発展させる。商業的先発国であれば、まず国家の動きとは無関係に商人が
外国に出て行き、本国との通商網を形成する。しかし商業的後発国であるスウェーデンは、国家が領事をあち
こちに派遣し、現地での商業情報を入手し、スウェーデン商人にそれを知らせたのである。国家主導型の経済
発展の典型がここにみられる。
　また、スウェーデンにしばらく帰国せず、地中海などの港での海運業（tramp shipping）に従事する商人にと
って、スウェーデン領事の商業情報は不可欠だったものと思われる。国家が、商人の活動に必要なインフラを
提供した。この政策は、スウェーデンの輸送料収入の増大ももたらした。
　1600年にはヨーロッパの北方に位置する辺境国にすぎなかったスウェーデンが、ヨーロッパ有数の海運国家
となった。1800年以降のスウェーデン工業化の成功には、この商船隊の輸出が不可欠であった。本論文は、以
上のようにまとめることができよう。
　このように、近世のヨーロッパ商業史のなかで、スウェーデンがどのような役割を演じていたのかが明確に
描かれている。本論文は、大国中心史観に陥りがちな研究者、さらには、研究対象となる地域を国際的文脈の
なかでとらえられない研究者に対して、大きな反省を迫る材料になろう。
玉木俊明（京都産業大学教授）
